Nuclear Safety Culture:

- ANS Panel Discussion Presentation, American Nuclear Society Summer Meeting, San Diego, June 2, 2003.  This is my slide presentation and speaker notes (can be read by an Internet browser) for the Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program approach to Nuclear Safety Culture as applied to the NIMITZ CVN68 aircraft carrier during the construction and testing period, 1972-1975.  This was a model Nuclear Safety Culture (slides 1 through 20).  In addition to the discussion of the Navy approach to Nuclear Safety Culture, several slides are provided that address go into additional detail on the generic characteristics of a desirable nuclear safety culture and the specific nuclear safety culture issues (problems) often found in the weaker commercial nuclear reactor plants (slides 21 through 34).  The original PowerPoint slides and speaker notes are also available.

- Introduction to Nuclear Safety Culture

- The Relevance of Nuclear Safety Culture to the New Regulatory Oversight Process

- Nuclear Safety Culture Quiz  - This is an 80 part, multiple choice quiz that provides an instructional perspective (training).  If you are able to complete and do well on this quiz, you are probably a positive influence in the nuclear safety arena.  People with no nuclear experience may also do well on this quiz since it deals primarily with culture. 

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Nuclear Safety Inspections and Assessments:

- Relevance of Technidigm-2000 to Nuclear Safety Assessments

- Applications of Technidigm-2000 to Nuclear Safety Assessments
 

- Level One Opinions on Nuclear Safety Assessment Processes
- Level Two Fact Management to Facilitate Oversight
- Level Three Inspection Method Examples
- Level Four Management Decision Examples

No one needs to be instructed on the importance of nuclear safety.  It is self evident.  Whether you are involved with nuclear reactors and the potential for the release of large quantities of radioactive fission products or with nuclear weapons and their nuclear explosion accident potential, you already understand that nuclear safety is important.

Short of these worst case events, there are also many lesser hazards of unnecessary exposure to radiation in general, as well as to the normal industrial hazards of high energy fluids and high voltage electrical lines.  Yet these lesser hazards impact the nuclear facility worker safety much more than than they impact public safety.  The public does show a lot of interest in any accident at a nuclear facility, even normal industrial accidents, but most of the hazard of working around nuclear facilities affects the nuclear workers themselves, not the general public.

Nevertheless, it has always been apparent that special precautions are required not only to protect the public but, also, to protect the nuclear facility worker from the consequences of an accident.  These special precautions are sometimes referred to as nuclear safety culture.  The precautions go beyond those needed at other industrial facilities, making it necessary for each nuclear facility worker to receive special training in this area.

With a good nuclear safety culture in place, it is possible to minimize the risk of working in the nuclear industry and to minimize the risk to the public.  Without a good nuclear safety culture at every nuclear facility in the world, it is only a matter of time before we have another major accident.  It is the purpose of the multi-selection quiz on nuclear safety culture is to point out some of the differences between a good nuclear safety culture and the normal safety culture found at most well-run industrial facilities.

History has proven that, even with our best efforts, low accident probabilities (such as one accident in a million years) are easier to describe than to attain.  The 1979 accident at Three Mile Island and the 1986 accident at Chernobyl quickly dispelled the notion that nuclear power safety can be established through design and procedures and then forgotten.  In view of the 1999 accident at Tokaimura, it is even more evident that a continuing nuclear safety culture is required at each nuclear facility, whether it is a reactor plant, a fissile fuels plant, or a nuclear weapons facility.

What is required is a culture that is so comprehensive and tough that a serious accident truly becomes incredible.  Given a good design and appropriate procedures that make an accident incredible, it is only when a nuclear facility's culture fails that a serious accident again becomes credible.  The culture fails most often because many nuclear facility managers and workers have never experienced a strong nuclear safety culture, so they assume that what they are doing in this area is adequate.

If we are to avoid another serious accident for the next several thousand years, we must upgrade our understanding and support of a better nuclear safety culture.  Also, many nuclear plant workers and safety professionals will want to review the new regulatory oversight process being implemented for nuclear power reactors in the United States in terms of its nuclear safety implications.  The new regulatory oversight process is far more dependent on having a good nuclear safety culture in place throughout the industry.

If you are already familiar with Technidigm-2000's 12 elements, the following paragraphs will make a lot of sense to you.  If you are not familiar with those 12 elements, the following paragraphs might seem a little strange, but you will still benefit from reading them.  One aspect of Technidigm-2000 is that it is mostly just organized common sense, which most people have anyway, so the 12 elements are easy to learn.

It is only when we are constrained by organizational limitations or unintended results of poorly conceived regulations that we lose our basic notions about common sense.  Thus, it is important to be able to fall back on these 12 elements when we find ourselves doing things that seem to contradict common sense.  Common sense is the foundation of a good nuclear safety culture.  It is also the foundation of a good nuclear regulatory oversight process, so it is important to stand back and take a good look at the new process from a common sense perspective, perhaps avoiding major problems in the future.

Perhaps the most difficult four elements of Technidigm-2000 are the four levels.  The nuclear industry is particularly susceptible to criticism since a lot of specialized education and training is required for someone to be able to achieve an understanding of nuclear power that rises above the opinion level (Technidigm-2000, Level One).  Almost everyone has an opinion about nuclear power, and many people also have some understanding of the relevant facts (Technidigm-2000, Level Two) that define the actual implementation of nuclear safety concepts.  There are also many highly educated physicists and engineers who can perform reasonably well and produce research and development (Technidigm-2000, Level Three).  The hard part is to put it all together so that our national and worldwide nuclear safety assessment processes are meaningful, accurate, and professional on a continuing basis.  That is, managers and regulators need to make good decisions (Technidigm-2000, Level Four).  Additional details about  Technidigm-2000 are available at http://Technidigm.org.

The NRC is pursuing ways to upgrade its nuclear safety assessment processes (summarized at http://www.nrc.gov/OPA/primer.htm and detailed at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/COMMISSION/SECYS/index.html#1999 under SECY-99-007).  In the ongoing development and implementation process, the industry and the regulators will probably achieve significant improvements.  This is because the new process is based largely on fundamental principles and common sense, consistent with Technidigm-2000 methods.  Nevertheless, it is evident that insufficient attention is being given to nuclear safety culture in this new approach.  At best, nuclear safety culture is relegated to "cross-cutting" programs that are to be addressed later, buried behind a complex array of "performance indicators."  Thus, it is largely up to each nuclear facility manager to make up for the oversight process shortfall in the area of nuclear safety culture.

Thus, the new regulatory oversight process departs from Technidigm-2000 common sense in these basic areas, driven by the off-the-level, polarized forces described in the Technidigm-2000 online book titled  On-the-Level, Common Sense Technically Speaking.   This departure is quite predictable, but expecting departures from common sense is not the same as correcting them.  Fortunately, the online book not only describes and predicts such polarized behavior, it also provides the 12-element framework needed by nuclear facility managers to keep things in perspective.

Further details on the regulatory process are linked below, followed by links to the computer graded safety culture quiz.

The following are links to comments (Level One Opinions) and frameworks (Level Two Facts and Level Three Research/Inspections) for assessing nuclear plant safety, safety culture, management, and functional areas and making key nuclear safety decisions (Level 4 Solutions).

Level One Opinions:
• Opinions on a March 2000 Question Received on Achieving an Effective,  Sustained Nuclear Safety Culture - What is required to get to a permanent solution to the culture issue?
• Opinions for January 2000 Pilot Plant Workshop - The NRC and NEI are ready to proceed with full implementation of the new regulatory oversight process (maybe).
• Opinions for Pilot Program Public Roundtables - Perspectives on meeting the objectives of the new reactor oversight process.
• Opinions Submitted to NRC in April 1999 - Suggestions on implementing Performance-Based Regulatory Oversight.
• Opinions Submitted to NRC in February 1999 - More attention to management and nuclear safety culture is still needed.

Level Two Facts and Their Management:

Delta Scores - Simplified approach to managing known safety issues (and the related facts and opinions), an elegant way to stay focused and communicate efficiently.

Level Three Research (Nuclear Safety Inspections by Functional Areas):

Nuclear Management Root Cause Assessments - Small, coordinated inspection teams can apply bottom-up and top-down approaches to inspecting operating nuclear facilities.

• Safety Assessments for Nuclear Facility Turnovers Between Organizations - Before you take responsibility for decommissioning.
• Decommissioning and Decontamination Project Assessments - After you take responsibility for decommissioning.

Level Four Decisions and Solutions:
• Nuclear Power Plant Technical Project Decisions (Specific Examples) - Actual Nuclear Utility management physical plant decision examples used to help a troubled (Watch List) plant.

For those who are serious about improving or validating their understanding of nuclear safety culture, take the Nuclear Safety Culture Multiple Selection Test.   Log in and take this 80-part multiple choice test, which is computer graded immediately.  In addition to a score (0 to 100), you will learn the key aspects of a good nuclear safety culture.
 
 

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