Common Sense, Technically Speaking
IRAQ WAR POLICIES AND SOLUTIONS
Principles, Objectives, Timing, and Context
The United States was founded and constituted over time within a
framework of basic principles. These principles were and are largely
based on human rights, basic freedoms, and the rule of law. It is
these same principles that we seek to make the foundation for the
people and government institutions in the new Iraq. Thus, one
objective of the United States is to establish conditions for and
promote an understanding of these fundamental freedoms and rights that
we ourselves so often take for granted.
Nevertheless, to be successful in winning such a principle-based
government infrastructure for the people of Iraq, we need to recognize
that the Middle East cultural context for this transition is far
different than the trans-Atlantic, anti-English-rule of our Founding
Fathers. A full description of these differences in revolutionary
context would be a daunting undertaking, but for most Americans the
basic differences are fairly apparent. In the Iraq-United States
relationship, the differences include political contrasts (on their
part an extreme dictatorial level of violence) and the differences in
religion, which are concurrently minor and profound. We can also
appreciate that fear still grips many hearts in Iraq, making it
difficult for Iraqis to join in the fight for their own freedom, an
attitude of passive acceptance that we find hard to understand. Also,
of course, the power of religion in their daily lives and the power of
religious leaders is significant, leaving little room for
individualism, a contrast that may be even less understood by many
Americans and other westerners.
Taken together, consideration of these obvious principle, objective,
and context basics suggests that timing and completion of the fighting
and transitional processes are also important. That is, if the wartime
struggles are seen as costly and unending, then the Iraqi people may
conclude that the United States version of freedom is not worth the
sacrifices involved. After all, even under the outrageously
suppressive and terror-based Saddam regime, the Iraqi people did not
spontaneously rise up on their own to get rid of this burden. The war
of liberation for Iraq was initiated from within the context of
increased levels of terror and resulting sense of outrage in the United
States. We should keep this in mind as we seek to understand the
ambivalence of the Iraqi people in striving for their own freedoms and
for a change in their political environment.
Moreover, none of this suggests that the Iraqi people are inclined to
reject their long established cultural practices and religious
beliefs. If anything, their cultural practices and religious beliefs
will become more vital to their ability to cope with their daily
challenges. The differences in Islamic and Christian teachings could
make it difficult for the United States leadership to appreciate the
basis for any growing resistance to the war on the part of the Iraqi
people. Part of that is likely the cultural notion that family
obligations and even tribal relationships emphasize taking revenge for
perceived wrongs, not turning the other cheek. Thus, more
self-education is probably needed on the part of our leaders as to the
differences in religious attitudes and mandates in the areas of
personal self-sacrifice and strong individualism as distinguished from
personal revenge and strong sense of group.
Politics, Opinion, Facts and Solutions
Overlaying these somewhat complex cultural issues of freedom and
related idealistic notions related to the individual citizens, both
Americans and Iraqis, are the political power struggles faced in both
countries. It is a bit easier in the United States since the political
struggle at least does not include majority-driving religious zealotry,
whereas the Iraqi people must also cope with the more direct
involvement of their religious leaders and principles in politics.
Likewise, of course, the United States military and Iraqi transitional
government must also deal with the powerful religious forces that are a
fact of life in Iraq. Indeed, without the ongoing repression of
religion by a dictatorial state, the religious groups in Iraq are
likely to grow in power and to dominate the emergent political
environment in Iraq. This likelihood significantly increases the
probability that, whatever government is established in Iraq as a
result of the war, that government will not be pro-western, much less a
reliable friend of the United States.
As is often demonstrated in the United States, politics and elections
are driven by opinions rather than facts. Even when the facts are
self-evident, public opinion is based on just that - opinion. Real
solutions to real problems may eventually evolve from public opinion,
but that is mostly accidental or "in spite of" the unnecessary
obstacles created when facts are ignored or not complete and not
adequately circumspect. Just as in other areas such as space shuttle
safety and nuclear power plant safety, solutions must be based on facts
and not opinion.
Good governmental solutions to problems result from the discovery and
due consideration of the applicable facts by experienced,
knowledgeable, and well-intentioned government leaders. Once the facts
are understood, it is usually useful to extract expert opinions to lay
out the path forward. Even then, solutions must be reconsidered and
continuously improved based on emerging new facts and factors as
progress is made toward the objective. Such changes should not be
attacked as evidence of weakness or failure on the part of the
leadership. Indeed, the absence of changes or "course corrections"
during a long and complex project is more likely to indicate the
presence of a fundamental problem.
The Real Objective
Our real objective in the Iraq war effort is to reduce and eliminate
terrorism in the world, with particular emphasis perhaps on terrorism
directed at American interests. It is perhaps no more relevant to
insist that Iraq be converted to western style democracy than to insist
that the Iraqi people all become Christians (or Jews, if you like).
Nevertheless, from the perspective of making available the opportunity
for the Iraqi people to "be free" as we perceive freedom, it is perhaps
more likely that the new government will be less likely to support
terrorist organizations.
Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear that extreme religious factions
would not continue to support terrorism even under a democratic
society. With this in mind, it is likely that a more intrusive look at
extreme religious views and factions will be required if the United
States is to achieve (or at least make progress toward) the real
objective of ridding the world of terrorism.
Feedback, Components, and Resources
Any systematic approach to solving a problem is likely to include
collecting and addressing the associated "feedback" that emerges over
time. Increased civilian casualties in Iraq may be an indication that
the solution is not working, but it can also be considered to be an
unavoidable consequence of the path required to reach the objective in
the context of the war. More non-combatants may become combative as a
result of their revenge-oriented culture.
We either have to accept this fact and press on toward the objective,
or back off from the conflict and let this anti-terrorist objective
slip away. Backing off, of course, leads to or constitutes failure
unless some other process takes its place, a process that leads toward
the desired objective. Such a process, for example, might be based on
turning the revenge-based anger of the Iraqi people in the direction it
ought to go, which is toward the insurgents and the remnants of the
previous regime. That is, if the Iraqi people want to get the United
States out of their country, then all they have to do is get rid of the
insurgents and remnants first. This would be as valid an objective as
the overall objective of ridding the world of terrorists.
Likewise, all non-Iraqi peoples around the world who want the United
States out of Iraq need only support the process to end terrorism there
and elsewhere. The apparent fact that it is easier to complain about
what the United States is doing in Iraq rather than complain about what
terrorist do everywhere simply reflects the fear instilled by
terrorism. It just happens that the United States has the resources to
oppose terrorism more effectively than most other countries, so the
United States is left largely on its own, supported by only a handful
of other relatively capable and high-principled countries. Most
countries are not so capable and, thus, are more likely to be
victimized by and fear terrorism. They may privately want us to
succeed, but public opinion and, thus, votes make direct and continuing
support of the war effort in Iraq and around the world less inviting
than it should be, at least from our American perspective.
With so many countries unable to participate in the war effort, for
whatever reasons, there are less than an ideal number of components in
the solution system or process, and the required resources are also
less available. Indeed, the United States component is strained to
provide the required resources for the war in Iraq, which makes it
increasingly unlikely that the war will succeed as time drags on. Time
is money, time is lives, and time does not stop just because we have a
temporary truce.
Overall, fewer lives and resources will be lost if time is not wasted.
Once any war is undertaken, it should best be pursued as expeditiously
as the rules of war allow and should not be encumbered with political
niceties that detract from reaching the objective.
History Is and Will Be
Past performance is indicative of future performance. History can
not be ignored, which is why the United States is so determined not to
create another Vietnam War. It is also why the enemy is so intent on
dragging things out and creating a Vietnam-like situation that will
tend to cause the American people to look for new leadership. Even if
such a result in American politics becomes a reality, no candidate
really wants to be elected under such circumstances.
The appropriate path forward for the American people could well be a
change in administrations, but it should be based more on improving the
leadership needed to reach the required anti-terrorism objective rather
than condemning the present leadership for what it has accomplished so
far. Thus, it is important for all Americans to support the war
effort vigorously, and for all politicians to either support the
solution process or suggest ways to improve it. If we are about to
enter into an era requiring a more sophisticated approach to the war,
perhaps a new set of leaders can be elected into power, but this should
be with the intention of carrying on more boldly and artfully rather
than regressing and condemning.
Just as when President Ronald Reagan came into office in a manner that
caused positive movement on the Iran hostage crisis, it is a
possibility that a new administration could come into office in 2005 in
a manner that causes positive movement in the Iraq war effort. A
perception that the new administration will be far more vigorous and
deliberate in dealing with terrorism and the Iraq situation could be
highly effective in achieving the overall goal of world peace.
Charles R. Jones
Technidigm.org
USNA'66
MIT'72
JHU'02
LCDR USN (Ret)
USS ENTERPRISE (1967-1970)
USS NIMITZ (1972-1975)
USS BAINBRIDGE (1976-1978)
US Department of Energy (1981-1986)
April 23, 2004
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