Notwithstanding our wisdom, there is a
visible feebleness in some of our proceedings
which gives encouragement to dissensions.
A society that can produce nuclear powered aircraft carriers and operate them safely for over 35 years ought to be able to figure out the best approaches for solving its basic social problems. There ought to be an optimal means of addressing every problem. Sometimes the optimal approach is to do nothing at all, but even this can not be determined without some work.
Deciding what to do and when to do it can be done within a framework that engineers refer to as systems. Engineers know that no system exists by itself, and most projects involve many systems. The systems in a project are mutually supportive, but they all compete for resources and attention. All of the systems in a project should be coordinated within a consistent and systematic framework that allows the project to meet its multiple objectives most efficiently. While social projects are not quite the same as engineering projects, a systematic framework can be applied to social projects and will at least get us headed in the right direction.
Yet, we may ask ourselves, why is it so difficult to achieve agreement
and to make real progress on social issues when "all we have to do" is
apply our knowledge of systems to our problems? Perhaps agreement difficulties
arise from off-the-level exaggerations of special interest groups. Having
a narrow agenda, their positions can be more extreme without becoming self-contradictory.
Thus, we frequently cannot achieve agreement on social issues because special
interest groups keep the dominant discussions off-the-level. Establishing
a Technidigm-2000 framework, we can force the debate of social issues into
a common format, a format that allows each person to understand the tradeoffs
that are involved. Reducing unnecessary confusion is the first step in
solving any complex problem.
Every system will have at least one component. While this is not a particularly profound statement, it leads us there. For example, as complex as the Earth's weather system is, many people think that it only has one component, the atmosphere. Other people would list the oceans, the sun, and even the mountains as component parts of the weather system.
Of course, each of these components is also a system in its own right. Thus, a component can be (and often is) a subsystem of a larger system. For simplicity, we can use these terms interchangeably, without having to dwell on whether a component is also a system or a subsystem.
A complete list of all such weather system components would actually be quite long and would lead to some debatable issues. Moreover, the debatable issues for many systems are sometimes related to interfaces between components. Importantly, interfaces are often interacted with differently from the perspectives of the components involved, so we can be talking about the same interface and still have some ambiguities.
If there are interface-related ambiguities, it is usually helpful to model interfaces between systems as two separate components. Interfaces come in pairs, and they can be opposite in character. Thus, for clarity, it is often useful to list a system's components, including its "opposing" interfaces with other systems. For example, communication across an interface requires a sender and a receiver in each direction. Thus, an interface usually has four components, any one of which might fail to perform well.
The 12-element model suggests that we consider the less obvious factors. Systems must be designed to fit into the right context, and their time-dependent factors must be compatible within the system and at its interfaces with other systems. The 12 Technidigm-2000 elements are highly interdependent and should be considered together.
It is through the application of these basic perspectives and systematic methods that Technidigm-2000 facilitates achieving optimal solutions. Even when there is no clear and final solution to a problem, a systematic approach provides the best assessment process and the optimal result.
When we have applied the first eight Technidigm-2000 elements in an honest manner, we can proceed systematically toward a compatible-solution mentality using systems, the last four elements. Even when we discuss a solution system at level one (opinions), we can develop reasonable, tentative solutions for further consideration, improvement, or reversal, at the higher three levels. Often, the result is a solution system that requires time to implement and that needs to be adjusted periodically based on feedback. Properly undertaken, a level four solution achieves the desired objectives.
Again, Technidigm-2000 provides a framework within which to address problems or issues more effectively. It provides (1) circumscribing requisites, (2) a powerful communications shorthand, and (3) a technology-compatible way of viewing social system complexities.
If a system becomes unstable, it can even self-destruct. The difference between inoperable and unstable is not unlike the difference between a boat running out of fuel and a boat capsizing. If it just runs out of fuel, it can be restored to its design functions of providing safe transportation rather easily. If it has capsized, it has failed in its function and might not ever be recovered and restored to its desired design function. Instabilities can be disastrous.
Considered as a whole, a system's stability is dependent on the status (including the rate of change of that status) of all of its components at a given time. A system is stable if external forces or perturbations produce only a temporary change in the system's overall status. The stability of the Earth's weather system is remarkable and is largely responsible for the presence of life as we know it today. In contrast, the world economy is less stable and requires an increasing level of attention as modern technology works both against and for stability.
However, mathematicians and engineers know that even very stable systems can be upset under certain conditions. Instabilities can come from different components or sets of components acting together. The symptoms of instability can be overt or subtle, and we might not be able to recognize and monitor all of them.
Averaging some symptoms or parameters of a stable system over a period of time can be as misleading as averaging the degree of heel of a rocking rowboat. The "average" position is always the same, so it is not as important as the rate or degree of rocking. There may also be a leak in the bottom of the rowboat or on the sides that lets water into the boat only at higher angles of heel. Thus, stability problems can be elusive.
Focusing on narrow issues such as "global warming" is a fundamentally flawed activity for addressing the stability of the Earth's atmosphere. Average temperatures could be the same, and we could still be approaching a major instability. What mankind is doing to the Earth's atmosphere and its interdependent components or subsystems probably has not occurred before in Earth's history. Also, much of our ability to record weather-related phenomena has been developed only recently. For example, the curvature, total length, and other characteristics of the world’s jet streams may be more significant than global warming, but our jet stream history information is limited. Thus, it can be misleading to make history-based assumptions regarding the stability of this complex weather without a more detailed look.
If we allow ourselves to be mislead, we can find ourselves in real danger. The danger arises as much from ignorance as it does from inexperience. Many people simply do not appreciate the vulnerabilities of stable systems. Mathematicians might describe the dangers mathematically as singularities, immediately causing most of our eyes to glaze over.
All they are saying is that we really do not know what happens at that point in the real world, although we can guess based on its neighborhood. Importantly, once we recognize that an instability exists and that we are in its neighborhood, it may be too late to correct the problem! Prudence would have us look as far ahead as possible, making no unwarranted assumptions.
Nuclear plant operators who think they can rely on intermittently adding water to the reactor coolant system to keep pressure up are in danger of creating an unstable condition in the pressurizer. The momentarily increased water surface temperature created by compressing the pressurizer "bubble" during such operations can cool rapidly. This would condense more water vapor and reduce pressurizer pressure, sucking in more cool water from the reactor coolant system, causing pressure to continue to go down.
During an actual plant emergency, such an unstable condition could quickly lead to an unrecoverable drop in pressure, out-gassing of hydrogen and other gasses in the coolant, collection of gas in the steam generator U-tubes, loss of natural circulation flow, and core meltdown. The final barrier to the release of large amounts of radioactive material to the atmosphere would only be the containment building. Just like at Three Mile Island and at Chernobyl, the costs would be high.
We can recognize the possibility of such instabilities and our proximity
to them best when we, at least, first understand the entire system and
its components. Then we must lay out a level four plan that maximizes system
success while avoiding its instabilities. Interestingly enough, understanding
system instabilities requires an understanding of principles and how principles
interface with each other. Technidigm-2000 helps us recognize principles
and avoid instabilities.
Many programs get launched based on their initial low cost, with little regard for life-cycle costs. The nuclear power industry was launched on a much smaller budget than is needed to meet its life-cycle requirements and related considerations. Significant upgrades were then made in safety programs and in end-of-life requirements, including the disposition of radioactive wastes. We went from cheap nuclear power to expensive nuclear power due to unforeseen expenses or by assuming that all the problems could be worked out later with little difficulty.
The level of resources needed by a program or system can also be dynamic. When we make major changes to a program in an effort to meet the same objectives, the total cost of meeting those objectives is likely to increase. Major changes are often the same as starting over and usually require increases in life-cycle costs. When we make minor changes to a program to increase its efficiency, the overall costs could be reduced. Minor changes are often simply ways to make the system work better, so minor changes usually pay for themselves.
Again, none of this is a mystery. We make resource decisions every
time we pay for something. Indeed, the application of resources over the
life of a project is not a mystery to any of us who have raised children.
Parents will do what they can for their children, but major repeats or
revisions are not usually undertaken when the resources are likely to be
wasted for a second time. For example, most parents who can will gladly
help pay for a college education, but only once. Likewise, society has
little tolerance for financial waste. This emphasizes the importance of
planning ahead when we assign resources to major projects. Again, this
is probably the easiest part of Technidigm-2000 to understand. Nevertheless,
resource limitations emphasize the need to deal effectively with the more
obscure parts before applying the bulk of those resources.
Resources are used by system components. System components perform functions intended to meet the system objectives without violating applicable principles. There are usually internal connections among system components and interfaces with external systems. Working together and as influenced by interfaces with the components of other systems, system components perform functions that help to solve a problem or meet a need.
Components are organized to perform their functions based on certain principles that make the overall system as reliable as needed to meet the system objectives. A system’s reliability goals can impact cost and efficiency goals. In most cases, perfect reliability is not attainable even when resources are unlimited. We often must make decisions regarding how much reliability we can afford. The Navy nuclear program can afford more reliability than commercial nuclear utilities largely because the Navy is not expected to make a profit. It only must be competitive and justifiable militarily relative to other options available to propel ships.
Special interest groups can not easily be effective components of
a good solution system. The reason for this is that, for every special
interest group, there is usually a competing special interest group making
a vigorous case for the exact opposite position. When opposing special
interest groups exist, they can be involved in the development and implementation
of a solution system only across insulating interfaces, providing facts
that must be carefully screened and tested for accuracy and completeness.
Even then everything contributed by special interest groups is inherently
suspect and is labeled under Technidigm-2000 as being, at best, level one
opinions. Level one opinions have little direct impact on level four solution
systems.
Also, a group that has a narrow agenda is more likely to be polarized and, thus, to have off-the-level requirements that they want to impose on others, including those who are not polarized and who may even be on-the-level. Moreover, when they are promoting what are otherwise on-the-level, useful objectives, special interest group rhetoric can be extremely slanted as they try to promote their positions. Whether we consider them on- or off-the-level, their rhetoric is intended to influence others so that will be given the resources needed to support its narrow agenda. A special interest group’s rhetoric does not promote a necessary or balanced agenda unless there is no other option.
It is important to remember that special interest groups are often
better than nothing. The U. S. Congress depends a lot on special interest
groups to supply basic information on a subject. Without Technidigm-2000,
little gets done without first being promoted by a special interest group.
However, with Technidigm-2000 it is easier to place resources where they
are needed and to use them efficiently to achieve a broader set of objectives.
Special interest group rhetoric is kept in its proper perspective when
we apply Technidigm-2000’s 12 elements.
This is why the federal government has to offer incentives to contractors to get them to do the work needed. Contractors are special interests that are driven by profits. When profit-motivated special interest groups are all we have available to get a job done, their contract incentives must be tied to the true objectives of the solution system.
This incentive approach is sometimes better than doing nothing, and it creates at least an artificial integrity. Incentives are also important in determining how well government internal components function. In particular, many government employees at all levels of government enjoy civil service protections or guarantees. While it is not fair to categorize all government employees as being dependent on such protections for their continued employment, it is difficult to find incentives sufficient to motivate government employees to perform their functions in a manner inconsistent with the office political atmosphere. Each government office is its own special interest group and is, thus, not likely to self-terminate when it has reached the end of its useful cost-effective life.
Individuals are expected to be "team players," a code used these days to encourage blind conformity to the needs of the group. That is, anyone who "rocks the boat" even in a level four solution system in an effort to meet legitimate system objectives is likely to get into political trouble within a government organization. Problems are likely to be buried within an organization since they reflect someone’s bad management. It only takes one manager in the organizational chain of command to hide an issue, but it takes all such managers to raise it to the top. Frequently, the only way to get attention for a management issue is for someone of integrity to take the initiative and go around or outside the chain of command.
We now refer to such people as whistle blowers, and we assume that
their government career is over or sidetracked as a consequence of their
integrity. They may be working toward legitimate functional goals, but
they are doing so in a negative incentive environment. Whistle blowers
often place their personal resources – their jobs and reputations – on
the line in an effort to promote a basic principle that is important to
them. Since this represents the possible presence of a remarkable level
of integrity, Technidigm-2000 solution systems can be viewed as being full
of such whistle blowers.
Program cancellation is the type of feedback that comes from external sources, and it is often directed at eliminating the resources for a program. Political parties are notorious for canceling the programs created by opposing political parties, in some cases resulting in frequent changes and waste without meeting any program objectives along the way.
The good kind of feedback critically important to any successful system is the kind that ensures the success of the program, including making the program efficient in its use of available resources. Engineering systems often have continuous feedback, using highly sensitive instruments to constantly control all of the key parameters of the system. Multiple sensors and layers of backup controls and checks are essential to ensuring the safety of nuclear plants, but they are also essential to many other safety-related industries and systems.
It is difficult to find any human activity that does not require feedback to be successful. We keep an eye on progress of cooking our dinner. Athletes strive for good scores relative to the competition. Many home electronic devices have self-tuning circuits. In many cases, we consider feedback to be vital to what we are doing. When feedback impacts us directly, we will take the appropriate actions to make improvements, assuming that we have the power to do so.
For many government programs, feedback is probably the most neglected and most misused element. Even when there is timely evidence of poor performance available, the government's path of least resistance is often either to reorganize or to spend more money. In many cases these easy paths avoid more difficult courses of action as well as avoid assignment of responsibility for problems.
For the average citizen, some feedback on a range of social problems is available from the news media, but the average citizen often has only indirect power to filter and assess this information and make the needed changes. In our modern, more technical society, chances are that the average citizen is not capable of deciding what is working and what is not working, much less how to correct problems. The news media should be of some help, but they are increasingly profit-and-loss special interest groups that depend on controversy rather than solutions.
For its part, Technidigm-2000 encourages and facilitates feedback for social problems and issues, including government and media issues. It is not likely that government and the news media will embrace Technidigm-2000 unless they are forced to do so under persistent insistence of the average citizen. Technidigm-2000 is designed explicitly for the general good, providing the average citizen with a powerful framework within which to understand how social programs are doing. It also affords project managers and government officials an opportunity to state their case clearly and achieve credibility as long as they address or use each of the 12 elements as part of the dialog.
Thus, we get to the problem that user feedback on Technidigm-2000 will determine its success, just like any other solution system. Fortunately, Technidigm-2000 implementation is based on the concept of continuous improvement. Each reader is challenged to think, so each reader improves even when perfect agreement with the concepts presented in this online book is not reached. The same is true of all books and all new concepts, but publishing and reading on the Internet minimize the resources invested while maximizing availability.
It is thus that Technidigm-2000 uses the Internet as an efficient
component for its solution system for promoting a modern version of Thomas
Paine’s Common Sense. As the hyperlink at the bottom of the page
indicates, you are invited to provide feedback on Technidigm-2000 so that
improvements can be made. Can you think of a suggestion?
Thus, when someone has principles, we expect them not to change much over time. A change in principles is likely to indicate the absence of character or integrity. However, a change in objectives has nothing to do with character or integrity as long as a principle is not violated. Politicians avoid stating their principles because principles can later be used as litmus tests for their credibility or integrity.
It is difficult to corner a politician regarding principles unless we can identify and assess their principles in terms of the associated objectives and how they are actually going to be achieved. Due to the nature of politics and the limitations of the voters, the absence of basic principles has often worked in a politician’s favor. Technidigm-2000 provides a powerful tool for clearly stating the underlying principles and the context within which objectives will be achieved. All we need ask is whether a political candidate has or subscribes to a given level four solution system that includes certain objectives and principles.
While a slick politician can say that it "needs work," it is easy to solicit specifics. A Technidigm-2000 solution system avoids the "needs work" argument because it is assumed that every solution system needs continuous work to achieve success. Success and effectiveness are dependent on emerging feedback information and how this information is used within the solution system architecture.
If a politician subscribes to no level four solution to a problem, that politician has no solution and should simply indicate that he does not know what course of action to take to achieve the desired objectives. If more than one level four solution system exist (or are claimed to exist), the citizen and the news media are in a good position to compare them.
The lack of a level four solution system implies that the politician is not a leader but a follower in that area. Even with an open admission of ignorance, a politician can be asked to state or concur in the associated objectives or, at least, the applicable principles. In any case, when politicians are running for office, making reference to level four solution systems provides voters with substantial evidence of their relative levels of competence and integrity.
Since principles, objectives, and solution systems are meaningless
without integrity, the first Technidigm-2000 related task is to ensure
that candidates are simply on-the-level. That is, one of Technidigm-2000's
objectives is to promote integrity. The underlying principle for
this objective is that all elected officials should have integrity.
Moreover, those candidates who are not willing (or able?) to understand
and apply the 12 elements of Technidigm-2000 can be considered to be unqualified
for office.
From the Technidigm-2000 perspective, special interest groups are
off-the-level because they are not seeking optimal solutions relative to
all other needs. It is only because special interest groups have become
so important that it is necessary for us to consider them as we learn about
the Technidigm-2000 alternative approach. Special interest groups represent
and promote poorly designed solution systems that have to be redesigned
or replaced with something better. At best, special interest groups are
only a potential source of some of the necessary level two facts that we
must collect as we proceed toward a level four solution system.
The four systems-specific elements of Technidigm-2000 are well connected to the first eight elements, especially when we consider the common denominator provided by principles. One of the most important aspects of engineering systems is that they are dependent on engineering principles to perform successfully. Likewise, Technidigm-2000 solution systems for social problems are only as effective as their underlying social principles.
Being on-the-level and using principles are the two most important
action pillars of Technidigm-2000. Keeping things in context and understanding
the uses and constraints of time are ways to keep the blinders off. Being
able to communicate in terms of the four levels ensures that we can get
credit where credit is due, even in a 10-second news bite society. Understanding
systems enables us to develop and communicate a framework for a solution
system.
A nuclear power plant has hundreds of systems that are designed, operated, and maintained in a manner that optimizes two real but opposing needs. On one side is the need for power production, ideally using a financially sound and competitive management program and a reliable physical plant. The opposing need is that this power must be produced in a manner such that the nuclear plant operation meets and exceeds safety standards. While perfectionists might argue that increased safety results in increased efficiency, such insights are often difficult to apply without using the broader, life-cycle perspectives of Technidigm-2000.
Each nuclear plant system has its own functions and sub-goals that support these opposing needs of the plant. Thus, each system design represents tradeoffs between financial effectiveness and safety. Likewise, each system is operated and maintained over the life of the plant with these tradeoffs in mind. The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission can not keep up with the intricacies of such tradeoffs, so a highly conservative regulatory environment is imposed on commercial nuclear power plants.
Ensuring nuclear plant safety requires the use of independent inspection teams. Often, such teams can only look at the details of one system. The feedback from their report is then generalized and applied as much as is feasible throughout the plant. Quality is ensured through a sampling process rather than using a comprehensive approach. When the sample reveals potential problems, the inspection team pursues the problems by expanding the sample in that area.
It is often left up to nuclear plant managers to identify and correct root causes of the problems. Unless this is done, the problems are likely to occur again and again. The identification of the actual root causes and the proper implementation of corrective actions is particularly difficult at nuclear plants due to the complexities of defense-in-depth requirements and all of the system interfaces and management entities involved with each issue.
As a nuclear safety consultant, my experience has been that many
nuclear plant system problems result from the failure to understand how
degraded components impact other components in a system. It is relatively
easy to observe and understand how gross events such as "waterhammer" impact
a system, but it is a little more difficult to detect and understand the
impact of degraded flow orifices. The root causes of problems are often
found on the other side of interfaces.
When I taught these experienced young Navy officers how to pass Admiral Rickover's staff's multiple interviews and eight-hour essay test, I made sure each of them understood the importance of trust. When a Navy nuclear ship is on the other side of the world and has an urgent technical problem to address, trust is important. While every Navy officer is full of integrity (just ask one), trust is an additional level of integrity that is application based. It is one thing to intend to be honest and forthright; it is another thing to actually know how to be honest and forthright when it is not particularly convenient.
For many years, Rickover's staff tested each chief engineer candidate in this area by simply continuing to ask more and more difficult questions until the candidate was forced to admit that he simply did not know the answer to the question. Indeed, the best answer was, "I don't know! My training does not include that area. I'd contact you guys to solve that problem. It's your job!" Somewhere during the interviews or examination, this type of questioning could be expected by each candidate.
Since I had figured out that such questioning was a key litmus test for the chief engineer examination, I prepared each of my students accordingly. In addition to knowing the details of their respective nuclear plants and all of the associated theory, they had to realize that guessing is not acceptable when nuclear plant safety is involved. This is a difficult concept for young people raised in society in which moral values have eroded and where much of education is based on guessing the answers to questions.
Interestingly enough, this Navy example is even more profound. Just
as important as the need for nuclear plant chief engineers to know their
limits, it is important for people to take responsibility for their jobs.
Rickover and his people not only took full responsibility, they got upset
if you did something that prevented them from doing so! This is one reason
why the Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program has been a world-class act for
so long. In addition to total focus on the objectives of comprehensive
nuclear plant safety and operational reliability, they have a group of
level four managers who are willing to accept full responsibility for all
aspects of a program.
Also, the many inspectors sent to the DOE facilities during this period did little to provide guidance on priorities because they were not familiar with the plant-specific context of the problems that they found. They were not even sure that real problems existed. It is a lot easier to list problems and potential problems than it is to assess and correct them. The net result was that most of the DOE nuclear facilities were either shut down or they operated under a staggering list of poorly organized suggestions for nuclear safety upgrades.
When the Executive Branch administration changed political parties in 1993, the frustrations in the nuclear safety programs led to a major shift of responsibilities. Program responsibilities were shifted from Washington, D. C. to managers in the field. The list of organization components remained essentially the same, but their roles were changed. The DOE organizational philosophy changed in mid-stream from centralized to decentralized, resulting in a significant shift in the location where the available human resources were needed.
As is the case for any major change in a program, this change resulted in additional expenses. Interestingly, the change placed the DOE organization back to where it was in the early 1980s in terms of its management style. Thus, we have an example where resources and roles were shifted around full circle in the search for an effective nuclear safety oversight and upgrade program. Such sweeping shifts are typical in polarized (e.g., political) situations.
For example, welfare programs compete with military programs for funding. Yet, from a government perspective, these are independent programs, and little is done to promote cooperation at the program interfaces with each other. The fact that some military personnel are paid at levels that qualify them for welfare payments is treated as a curiosity by most people. Yet, it is treated as an opportunity by military special interest groups to get military raises. Such "revelations" should not be surprises. They should simply be controlled and intended conditions that result from systematic programs that are well thought out and integrated.
When integration and cooperation are not promoted at the interface between two programs, then a special interest group mentality develops as the default relationship. The arguments become less logical and more emotional. Since each program can have many such defaulted interfaces with other programs, it is easy to see how social confusion can be the result.
In the worst case, every social program can have a special interest group mentality at every interface. This is the exact opposite of what is needed, contrasting sharply with what is required for technology-oriented projects such as nuclear power plants and the space shuttle program. As society becomes more complex or when it changes at a faster pace, it becomes more difficult to address the issues that arise from the non-systematic, special interest group mentality.
Increasingly, special interest groups have become the province of
those who are the most radical special interest promoters. The "silent
majority" grows as the more radical groups shrink down to their most radical
elements. Rather than organized cooperation, we get communication chaos
in the form of one-sided attacks and, to get anything done at all, we often
are asked to accept compromises between extreme positions. Nevertheless,
we would be wise to keep in mind that compromise is not the same as
optimize.
Most of us have a rather wide range of things that are important to us, even when we are trying to do something that is relatively simple. Knowing this range of important things is not sufficient for us come up with a reasonable solution to a problem. If all you want to do is get from point A to point B efficiently, then you might as well get a motorcycle. If you also want to get there safely, the agenda doubles. The safest vehicle might be an army tank.
The number of possible transportation solutions, however, more than doubles simply because of the many possible tradeoffs between efficiency and safety and the many options that exist between motorcycles and tanks. There are many other possible factors to consider, so we are seldom able to address even simple problems without a systematic approach.
The difficulty has been the lack of a systematic process and framework within which to filter out the confusion arising from the folks who have a limited agenda. Somewhere within the extreme positions of special interest groups we may find the optimal answers to many problems. Sometimes we think that those long-sought optimal positions are simply a compromise between the two extremes. If compromises between extremes were good ideas, we would have a lot of two-wheeled tanks on the road. Likewise, when two political parties compromise their extreme positions, the result is seldom optimal.
Technidigm-2000 provides a synergistic means of arriving at better solutions, first by avoiding input from people who are not on-the-level and, second, by filtering some of the confusing information provided by those who are on-the-level. Technidigm-2000 makes it possible for well-meaning political entities to achieve such solution systems. It is just harder for politicians to be on-the-level long enough to do so.
By now the reader realizes that the four Technidigm-2000 levels provide confusion filters, allowing each of us to communicate what is on our mind without having to take opinions and incomplete facts too seriously. By the time a problem gets to level four, most of us are on the sidelines and waiting for an optimal solution.
If all the players are on the same team, the scoring can be dramatic,
and the results are even more acceptable since everyone wins. The solution
process becomes less like a game and more like a cooperative endeavor.
Just like climbing a mountain is best undertaken cooperatively, most difficult
social problems are best addressed when we all have the same objectives
and the same principles. Technidigm-2000 facilitates such cooperation.
When someone asks whether you have any questions, you will be able to come up with at least 12 questions very easily:
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